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Abstract
Many organisations are releasing microdata everyday for business and research purposes.
This data does not include explicit identifiers of an individual like name or address but
it does contain data like date of birth, pin code, sex, marital-status etc which when
combined with other publicly released data like voter registration data can identify an
individual. This joining attack can also be used to obtain sensitive information about
an individual, thus, putting the privacy of an individual in grave danger.
K-anonymization is a technique that prevents the above mentioned attacks by modifying
the microdata which is released for business or research purposes. This is done by
applying generalization and suppression techniques to the microdata. In this paper,
k-anonymity is introduced and also some of the algorithms are studied which help in
achieving k-anonymity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Microdata is being published by many organizations for many different purposes such
as business, demographic research, public health research etc. This published data can
put the privacy of an individual at risk. To protect the anonymity of the entities, the
data holders encrypt or remove the explicit identifiers such as name, phone numbers,
social security number and addresses.
However, other attributes like sex, date of birth, zip code, race etc when combined to-
gether with publicly released information, can be used to identify the anonymous indi-
viduals. The large amount of information that is easily accessible today, when combined
with the increased computational power available to the attackers, make such attacks a
serious problem.
Information about us is collected on a day to day basis, as we join companies or groups,
shop for groceries, or execute our common daily activities the amount of privately owned
records describing each citizen’s finances, interests, and demographics is increasing every
day. Information bureaus such as TRW, Equifax, and Trans Union hold the largest and
most detailed databases on American consumers. Many municipalities sell population
registers that include the identities of individuals along with basic demographics; ex-
amples include voter lists, city directories, local census data, tax assessors, information
from motor vehicle agencies, and real estate agencies. Typical data contained in these
databases may include names, social security numbers, race, date of birth, addresses,
telephone numbers, marital status, and employment/salary histories. These data, which
are often publicly distributed or sold, can be used for linking identities with de-identified
information, thus allowing re-identification of respondents. This type of situation has
raised particular concerns in the medical and financial fields, where microdata, which are
increasingly released for circulation or research, can be or have been subject to abuses,
threatening the privacy of individuals.
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1.1 Objective
The following are the main objectives which need to be achieved:-
• To release maximum amount of data so that it can be used for business or research
related work by various organisations
• To ensure that privacy of no individual is being put in danger due to the released
data by protecting released information against inference and linking attacks
1.2 Wrong Approach
Removing the unique identifiers such as Name, Employee Id from a table cannot
guarantee privacy. Other attributes like Date of Birth, Sex, PIN Code when com-
bined together can also reveal the identity of an individual.Re-identification is possible
by using a set of attributes and another database containing the same set of attributes.
Sometimes this approach can also leak sensitive information about an individual. An
example depicting the attack is shown below:
An attacker can simply combine the information obtained from hospital patient data
and vote registration data. By matching the attributes like DOB, Sex and Zipcode the
attacker can easily infer that Andre is suffering from a heart disease which is a very sen-
sitive information related to an individual. As it is pretty evident that hiding the name,
phone number or other explicit identifiers does not guarantee the security of sensitive
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information of an individual, therefore, we need more effective techniques to achieve our
objective.
1.3 Related Work
A few approaches that can solve our problem and help us in our objective are the
following:-
• k-anonymity
• l-diversity
• t-closeness
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Literature Survey of k-Anonymity
k-anonymity is one of the techniques which help us in releasing a huge amount of data
so that it can be used for business or research related work by various organisations by
ensuring that privacy of no individual is being put in danger due to the released data
by protecting released information against inference and linking attacks.
2.1 Basic Definitions
• Key Attribute - The attribute that can identify an individual directly is known
as the key attribute. It is always removed during the release of data. e.g. Name,
Mobile No.
• Quasi-Identifier - The set of attributes that can be used to identify an individual
by using any means is called quasi-identifier. e.g Date of Birth, PIN Code.
• Sensitive Attribute - The attribute containing the sensitive information about
an individual is the sensitive attribute. e.g. Salary, Health Problem
2.2 k-Anonymity
k-anonymity states that there should be at least k tuples having the same quasi-identifier
values to guarantee an individual’s privacy. Every tuple in a table should be similar to
at least (k-1) tuples then only the table will achieve k-anonymity.
4
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K-anonymity is achieved by using generalization and suppression.Following is an example
of a table satisfying 2-anonymity with respect to each attribute:-
2.3 Generalization
Conversion of any value to a more general form is the process of generalization. E.g.
“Male” and “Female” can be generalized to “Person”. Generalization can be applied at
the following levels:
• Attribute (AG): Generalization is performed at the level of column; a general-
ization step generalizes all the values in the column.
• Cell (CG): Generalization is performed on single cells; as a result a generalized
table may contain, for a specific column, values at different generalization lev-
els. E.g. DOB, where generalizing date, month and year form different levels of
generalization.
2.3.1 Domain Generalization Hierarchy
Domain Generalization Hierarchy can be defined as a graph or a lattice which acts as
the solution space for our k-anonymity problem. The nodes of this lattice are achieved
by generalizing different combination of attributes together at various levels.
Example
Consider two attributes ”Sex” and ”PIN Code” of a relation T. Value of attribute Sex at
level 0 of generalization can be ”Male” and ”Female”. To achieve level 1 of generaliza-
tion with respect to attribute Sex we must generalize the values ”Male” and ”Female”.
We can generalize these two values to another value, say, ”Person”. By generalizing the
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values of attribute Sex to ”Person” we achieve level 2 generalization with respect to Sex.
Lets take another attribute PIN Code from relation T. Let us assume that PIN Code
can have values ”110010”, ”110011” and ”110012” at level 0 generalization. We can
generalize these values to ”11000x” and ”11001x” to achieve level 1 generalization with
respect to attribute PIN Code. Further, we can generalize the values to ”1100xx” in
order to achieve level 2 generalization with respect to attribute PIN Code. By com-
bining different levels of generalization of different attributes we can form the Domain
Generalization Hierarchy in the following manner:-
2.4 Suppression
Removing any value completely from a data table is the process of suppression. Sup-
pression can be applied at the following levels:
• Tuple (TS): Suppression is performed at the level of row; a suppression operation
removes a whole tuple
• Attribute (AS): Suppression is performed at the level of column, a suppression
operation obscures all the values of a column.
• Cell (CS): Suppression is performed at the level of single cells; as a result a
k-anonymized table may wipe out only certain cells of a given tuple/attribute.
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2.5 Models of k-anonymity
he possible combinations of different types of generalizations and suppressions result in
different models of k-anonymity. The following are the different models:-
• AG TS: Generalization is applied at the level of attribute (column) and suppres-
sion at the level of tuple (row).
• AG AS: Both generalization and suppression are applied at the level of column.
No specific approach has investigated this model. It must also be noted that if
attribute generalization is applied, attribute suppression is not needed. It becomes
equivalent to AG (attribute generalization and no suppression).
• AG CS: Generalization is applied at the level of column, while suppression at the
level of cell. It allows to reduce the effect of suppression, at the price however of
a higher complexity of the problem.
• AG : Generalization is applied at the level of column, suppression is not consid-
ered.
• CG CS: Both generalization and suppression are applied at the cell level. Then,
for a given attribute we can have values at different levels of generalization. By
observations, this model is equivalent to CG (cell generalization, no suppression).
• CG : Generalization is applied at the level of cell, suppression is not considered.
• TS: Suppression is applied at the tuple level, generalization is not allowed.
• AS: Suppression is applied at the attribute level, generalization is not allowed.
No explicit approach has investigated this model.
• CS: Suppression is applied at the cell level, generalization is not allowed. Again,
it can be modeled as a reduction of AG .
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k-Anonymity Algorithms and
Their Comparison With Various
Parameters
3.1 k-Anonymity Algorithms
Based on different models of k-anonymity there are various algorithms to achieve k-
anonymity. A few algorithms for AG TS model are the following:-
• Incognito Algorithm
• Samarati’s Algorithm
• Sweeney’s Algorithm
3.2 Incognito Algorithm
3.2.1 Basic Incognito
This algorithm produces all the possible k-anonymous full-domain generalizations of a
relation(say T), with an optional tuple suppression threshold. It begins by checking
single-attribute subsets of the quasi-identifier, and then iterates, checking k-anonymity
with respect to larger subsets of quasi-identifiers.
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3.2.2 Algorithm
Input: Private table PT; quasi-identifier QI=(A1,....,An), k constraint; hierarchies
DGHAi, where i=1,...n.
Output: MGT, a generalization of PT[QI] with respect to k.
• Let the set of candidate nodes be Ci and the set of direct multi-attribute general-
ization relationships(edges) connecting these nodes by Ei. A modified breadth-first
search is performed over the graph and we get a set of multi-attribute generaliza-
tions of size i.
• The set of candidate nodes of size (i+1) i.e. Ci+1 and the edges Ei+1 is constructed.
• Repeat the above steps until a node satisfying k-anonymity with respect to PT is
found.
• Return the table with respect to the satisfying node as the MGT.
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3.2.3 Results of Incognito Algorithm
The basic incognito algorithm was applied to the adult dataset using java and oracle
database. The java code was implemented in eclipse juno and for database Oracle
10g was used. The attributes age,race,sex,education,marital-status were taken as
the quasi-identifier from the adult dataset.
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3.2.4 Advantages
• The algorithm finds all the k-anonymous full domain generalizations
• The optimal solution can be selected according to different criteria
3.2.5 Disadvantages
• The algorithm uses breadth first search method which takes a lot of time to traverse
the solution space
3.3 Samarati’s Algorithm
This algorithm searches for the possible k-anonymous solutions by jumping at different
levels in Domain Generalization Hierarchy(DGH). It uses the binary search to obtain
the solution in less time. This algorithm implements the AG TS model. Therefore,
suppression can be used to achieve k-anonymity. MaxSup is the maximum number of
tuples that are allowed to be suppressed to achieve k-anonymity.
3.3.1 Generalized table - with suppression
Let Ti and Tj be two tables defined on the same set of attributes. Table Tj is said to
be a generalization (with tuple suppression) of table Ti, denoted Ti ≤ T j , if:
• | T i |≤| T j
• the domain dom(A, Tj) of each attribute A in Tj is equal to, or a generalization
of, the domain dom(A, Ti) of attribute A in Ti
• it is possible to define an injective function associating each tuple tj in Tj with
a tuple ti in Ti, such that the value of each attribute in tj is equal to, or a
generalization of, the value of the corresponding attribute in ti
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3.3.2 Distance Vector
Let Ti(A1, ....., An) and Tj(A1, .....,An) be two tables such that Ti ≤ T j . The distance
vector of Tj from Ti is the vector DVi,j = [d1, ....., dn], where each dz, z = 1, .....,n,
is the length of the unique path between dom(Az, Ti) and dom(Az, Tj) in the domain
generalization hierarchy DGH.
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• The height of a distance vector DV in a distance vector lattice VL is denoted by
height(DV, VL)
• if there is no solution that guarantees k-anonymity suppressing less than MaxSup
tuples at height h, there cannot exist a solution, with height lower than h that
guarantees it.
• This property is exploited by using a binary search approach on the lattice of dis-
tance vectors corresponding to the domain generalization hierarchy of the domains
of the quasi-identier
3.3.3 k-minimal generalization - with suppression
Let Ti and Tj be two tables such that Ti ≤ T j , and let MaxSup be the specified
threshold of acceptable suppression. Tj is said to be a k-minimal generalization of table
Ti if the following conditions are satisfied:-
• Tj satisfies k-anonymity enforcing minimal required suppression, that is, Tj sat-
isfies k-anonymity and ∀T z : Ti ≤ T z;DVi,z = DVi,j ; Tz satisfies k-anonymity
⇒| T j |≥| Tz |
• | T i | − | T j |≤MaxSup
• ∀T z : Ti ≤ T z and Tz satisfies conditions 1 and 2 ⇒a (DV i,z) <(DVi,j )
3.3.4 Algorithm
Input: Private table PT; quasi-identifier QI=(A1,....,An), k constraint; lattice VL
Output: MGT, a generalization of PT[QI] with respect to k.
• Consider lattice VL of height h = height(T, VL), where T is the top element of
the lattice.
• the vectors at height [h/2] are evaluated. If there is a vector that satisfies k-
anonymity within the suppression threshold established at height [h/2], then:
– the new area of search is the lower half i.e. from 0 to [h/4].
– otherwise the new area of search is the upper half i.e. from [h/2] to [h].
• Repeat step 2 until the algorithm reaches the lowest height for which there is a
distance vector that satisfies k-anonymity. Return the PT with respect to the
distance vector as the MGT.
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3.3.5 Results of Samarati’s Algorithm
The Samarati’s algorithm was applied to the adult dataset using java and oracle database.
The java code was implemented in eclipse juno and for database Oracle 10g was
used. The attributes age,race,sex,education,marital-status were taken as the quasi-
identifier from the adult dataset.
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3.4 Sweeney’s Algorithm
According to Sweeney, the best solutions are attained after generalizing the variables
with the unique values. The search space is the whole lattice. This approach only goes
through a very small number of nodes in the lattice to find its solution. Thus, from a
time perspective, this approach is very efficient.
3.4.1 Algorithm
Input: Private table PT; quasi-identifier QI=(A1,....,An), k constraint; hierarchies
DGHAi, where i=1,...n.
Output: MGT, a generalization of PT[QI] with respect to k.
• Consider a table MGT = PT[QI]
• While k-anonymity is not achieved and the count of the remaining rows that do
not comply to k-anonymity is more than k:
– Get the number of distinct values of each attribute in MT
– Generalize the attribute with the most distinct values
• Suppress the remaining rows and return MGT.
3.4.2 Results of Sweeney’s Algorithm
The Sweeney’s algorithm was applied to the adult dataset using java and oracle database.
The java code was implemented in eclipse juno and for database Oracle 10g was
used. The attributes age,race,sex,education,marital-status were taken as the quasi-
identifier from the adult dataset.
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3.4.3 Advantage
• The algorithm checks very few nodes for k-anonymity due to which it is able to
give results very fast.
3.4.4 Disadvantage
• The algorithm skips many nodes, therefore, the resulting data is very generalized
and sometimes this released data may not be suitable for research purpose as it
provides very little information.
3.4.5 Comparison between Samarati’s Algorithm and Datafly Algo-
rithm
• The Samarati’s algorithm evaluates all the nodes at a generalization level whereas
Sweeney’s algorithm skips a lot of nodes when moving between levels in search of
a solution.
• The Samarati’s algorithm provides a solution with minimal generalization and
suppression which Sweeney’s algorithm does not provide.
• Sweeney’s algorithm is able to obtain a solution very fast as compared to Samarati’s
algorithm.
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3.5 Results
The result of all the algorithms combined together are shown below.We can clearly
observe that as the value of k and number of records increase the time taken to achieve
k-anonymity also increases.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis we described how microdata released by various organisations for research
or business purpose can compromise the security and privacy of an individual. In or-
der to guarantee the anonymity of individuals and protect the released microdata from
any attacks we discussed the work that has been done in order to protect the released
microdata by the means of k-anonymity. Three basic algorithms for k-anonymity, Incog-
nito algorithm, Samarati’s algorithm and Sweeney’s algorithm, were studied upon where
each of the algorithms had certain advantages and disadvantages. These algorithms were
based on the AG model and AG TS model of k-anonymity. We measured the effective-
ness of these algorithms by plotting the graph between value of k and time taken to
achieve k-anonymity with respect to the number of records. These algorithms have been
really helpful in reducing the number of attacks on the microdata and securing sensitive
information of the individuals.
4.0.1 Future Work
The algorithms discussed in this thesis can be further improved by reducing the size of
the solution space and applying improved searching algorithms. An effective algorithm
can be applied by combining the Samarati’s algorithm and Sweeney’s algorithm. The
Sweeney’s algorithm can be used to reduce the solution space by achieving the lower
limits and upper limits effectively for the Samarati’s algorithm and then Samarati’s
algorithm can be applied to obtain the efficient solution for k-anonymity. This technique
can greatly reduce the time taken to achieve k-anonymity and also produce an efficient
solution
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